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ESSAY
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NATURAL
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS*
NICHOLAS MERCURO** AND MICHAEL D. KAPLOWITZ***
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades, a variety of legal movements and
theories have evolved to make the study of law less autonomous and
1
more open. These several academic movements advocate different
jurisprudential discourses and understandings of modern law, and
have impacted public policy in different ways and magnitudes. Each
movement writes and thinks about law and public policy differently;
each maintains a different conception of the role of the State. Among
the more dominant of these movements are the several schools of
thought comprising Law & Economics.2 Law & Economics has de* This paper draws on previous work. See Nicholas Mercuro, Toward a Comparative Institutional Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (1989);
NICHOLAS MERCURO, ECOLOGY, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); Nicholas Mercuro, Relevant
Output Categories for a Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, in STEVEN
G. MEDEMA, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WARREN J. SAMUELS (forthcoming 2001). The authors
would like to thank Steven G. Medema and David Schweikhardt for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
** University-wide Professor, Lyman Briggs School, Michigan State University. Ph.D.,
Michigan State University; M.B.A., Seton Hall University; B.A., Pennsylvania State University.
*** Assistant Professor, Dept. of Resource Development, Michigan State University.
Ph.D., Michigan State University; J.D., Duke University; M.A., Johns Hopkins; B.S., Union
College (NY).
1. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987); Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79 (1987);
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S
END (1995).
2. The use of the ampersand between “Law” and “Economics” connotes the collective
schools of thought. For an overview of the several schools of thought that comprise the field of
Law & Economics, see NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM (1997).
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veloped from a small and rather esoteric branch of research within
both economics and legal studies to what is now a substantial movement that has helped redefine the study of law and help fashion public policy.
Law & Economics is not a homogeneous movement, but instead
is composed of several traditions, sometimes competing and sometimes complementary. As Figure 1 illustrates, it includes: Chicago
Law and Economics, Public Choice Theory, American Institutional
Law and Economics, Neoinstitutional Law and Economics, the New
3
Haven School, and Modern Civic Republicanism.
Law & Economics

Chicago Law
and Economics

Public Choice
Theory

New Haven
School

Modern Civic
Republicanism

American
Institutional
Law and
Economics

Neoinstitutional
Law and
Economics

Comparative
Institutional
Approach to
Law and
Economics

Figure 1: Schools of Thought in Law & Economics
The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to set forth a
comparative institutional approach for analyzing natural resource and
environmental policy. Such an approach is consistent with the ideas
and ideals that emanate from both institutional economics and
American Institutional Law and Economics.4 The second is to sug3. The reader should not be confused by the titles “American Institutional Law and Economics” and “Neoinstitutional Law and Economics.” Neoinstitutional Law and Economics, like
other Chicago-oriented schools of thought within Law & Economics, actively distances itself
from the institutionalist perspective. For example, it is not unusual to see proponents of Neoinstitutional Law and Economics assert that “[Neoinstitutional law and economics] has little in
common with the older Institutionalists, whose research extends back to the work of Commons
and Veblen.” JOHN N. DROBAK & JOHN V.C. NYE, THE NEW FRONTIERS OF THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS xv (1997).
4. See generally Steven G. Medema et al., Institutional Law and Economics, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000).
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gest six performance indicators for use in assessing institutional alternatives and for informing choice with respect to natural resource and
environmental policy.
However admirable it may seem to argue for maintaining the
quality of the environment or for displaying concern over the dissipation of a nation’s natural resources, few areas of public policy have
produced conflicts of such a heightened magnitude within nations as
well as between nations. One mechanism for channeling environmental conflicts and for informing choice is the use of what is termed
5
here as a comparative institutional approach to public policy. Within
this approach, society is perceived as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage where and when an identity of interests exists among
actors. At the same time, society is an arena of conflict where there
exists a mutual interdependence of incompatible claims or interests.
The manner in which a society structures its political/legal institutions
helps shape the character of life in that society. Thus, society structures its institutions in order to: i) enhance the scope of its cooperative natural resource and environmental endeavors, ii) channel internal natural resource and environmental conflicts toward resolution,
and iii) institutionalize mechanisms for changing existing law and
policy.
It is important to understand the role of individuals in a comparative institutional approach to public policy. They are assumed to
take actions both individually and collectively. It is posited that individual actions are taken to advance individual interests or to advance
individual or group perceptions of the public interest. The manifestation of one political/legal institution or structure of rights in a society
over another in response to the natural resource and environmental
issues confronting it—and the legitimacy of that institution or rights
regime—can be interpreted, in part, as an expression (at the most
fundamental level) of those who prevailed in the choice-making processes.

5. The need for a comparative institutional approach to legal-economic policy has long
been recognized. Proponents of a comparative institutional approach, coming from somewhat
different perspectives, include: Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960); Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1969); Neil K. Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative
Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994);
Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry Weingast, Political Solutions to Market Problems, 78 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 417 ( 1984); and Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184 (1987).
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II. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY6
A. Stages of Choice
The selection or establishment of a specific set of institutions,
and thus the character of life in a society, is the product of choice.
What the field of American Institutional Law and Economics has to
7
say about some of these matters is pertinent to a wide array of issues.
However, the purpose here is to focus on natural resource and environmental issues and related public policy. Within the comparative
institutional approach, attention is focused on three different stages
of choice. First, it is necessary to describe and understand the emergence of the most basic social contract that binds people together.
This can be termed the constitutional stage of choice. Second, it is
necessary to describe and understand both the structuring and the revising (or restructuring) of political/legal institutional decisionmaking processes—the so-called institutional stage of choice. Finally,
the consequent economic impacts of the legal relations governing society must be analyzed and understood—the economic impact stage of
choice (see Figure 2).
1. Constitutional Stage of Choice
In order to understand the nature of the choices necessary at the
constitutional stage, it is useful to start off thinking about a society in
a conceptual state of anarchy. In such a state, individuals will contemplate the opportunity costs associated with the protectivedefensive resource diversions that are necessary and essential for life
under a system of anarchy.8 Once they recognize the potential prospects for improvement in the character of their economic life that
would become possible by establishing a social contract or constitu6. The three stages of choice outlined here were originally presented in NICHOLAS
MERCURO & TIMOTHY P. RYAN, LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1984). They
were later revised into their present form in NICHOLAS MERCURO, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1
(1989); and NICHOLAS MERCURO, ECOLOGY, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997). For alternative
formulations of the nexus among rights, institutions, and economic performance, see A. ALLAN
SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER, AND PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND ECONOMICS
(2nd ed. 1987); DANIEL BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND POLICY (1991); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989);
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
7. See generally Medema et al., supra note 4.
8. See Richard McKenzie & Gordon Tullock, The Emergence of Social Order: Defining
Behavioral Limits, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 75, 75-91 (1978).

MERCURO_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC

Fall 2000]

04/17/01 12:47 PM

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

143

tion, they will enter into some form of social contract or will formally
adopt a constitution. In establishing their constitution, the individuals
will seek to spell out the behavioral limits of what is and what is not

“working rules” and “legal doctrines”

•

•

•

•

Figure 2: Stages of Choice
mutually acceptable conduct and to lay out the so-called rules for
making rules. For instance, with respect to a nation’s constitution,
there is the issue of whether environmental protection is considered a
fundamental right retained by the individual, thereby enjoying a protected status, or whether environmental protection is a mere goal or
9
general statement of public policy.
It must be noted that while the established constitution is typically thought to have only a subtle effect on the allocation and distribution of resources—particularly with respect to natural resource and
environmental policy—that subtle impact cannot be ignored. Constitutions are not immutable: the methods by which constitutional rules
can be revised are developed at this level of choice. The relationships
among emergent institutions are partially resolved at the constitu-

9. This matter is fully explored in Ernest Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8-21, 81-98 (1992).

MERCURO_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC

144

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

04/17/01 12:47 PM

[Vol. 11:139

tional stage of choice. Which institutions finally prevail over others in
making policy must be decided at this stage of choice, e.g, the decision to provide a system of checks and balances in the court’s review
of natural resource and environmental regulations or procedures.
The essential point to be understood is that whatever branches of
government and institutions come to characterize a society, they owe
their development, existence, and legitimacy to the initial choices
made at the constitutional stage. Once the constitution is framed, it
will then provide the basis for the emergence of a broad assemblage
of legal-economic institutions that will more directly affect the allocation of resources in society, and with that, the ecological integrity of
the many ecosystems that make up a nation’s environment. The
structuring of legal-economic institutions constitutes the institutional
stage of choice.
2. The Institutional Stage of Choice
The institutional stage of choice focuses directly on the structure
of the political/legal institutions (more commonly referred to as the
State) as well as the revision of those institutional structures. The two
core elements at this stage of choice are the fundamental legal doctrines and specific working rules of institutional decision-making processes. Legal doctrines evolve over time through legal decision making, whereas working rules (the decision-making processes of an
institution) are formally worked out by the institution itself, often in
the form of bylaws. Legal doctrines and working rules are partially
established by the rules worked out at the constitutional stage of
choice; they are also partially a function of the decisions of other institutions developed under complex procedures. Examples of the latter include a court decision which imposes certain restrictions or obligations either upon the decision-making processes of a legislative
body regarding environmental statutes or upon the decision-making
processes of a government agency regarding the regulation of natural
resources.
Examples of subjects where the institutional choices to be made
involve evolving legal doctrines include: i) the criteria for whom will
be granted standing in a court of law in environmental disputes, ii)
the criteria designating who may intervene in environmental litigation
(e.g., amicus curiae), iii) the standards of admissibility for evidence in
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environmental cases (e.g., Daubert -type questions), and iv) the
measure of adequacy of proof of causation in toxic tort cases. In
these and many more instances, as with working rules, the evolution
of legal doctrine impacts a nation’s natural resources and environmental integrity.
Individuals also attempt to establish or revise working rules in
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and government agencies. Examples of areas where changes are sought in working rules,
include: i) the scope of natural resource or environmental policy actions that come under the doctrine of executive privilege, ii) the rules
of court, and iii) the rules for determining legislative committee structures, i.e., regarding which committee will oversee the nation’s natural resources and under what rules for chairing (agenda control) and
serving (participation). The area generating perhaps the most
potential impact, however, concerns the working rules of government
agencies and commissions overseeing natural resources and environmental protection, of which there are several examples. One such example would be the administrative rules that determine the role of intervenors at environmental hearings. Another example would be the
methods or procedures by which environmental standards or criteria
are set by such federal agencies as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
Department of the Interior (DI)—for instance, how the EPA determines which chemicals or pollutants cause cancer; how the EPA establishes establish specific environmental criteria or standards for allowing “green labeling” of consumer products; and, whether and to
what extent the DI will set in place regional advisory councils to establish grazing regulations on public lands. These are all changes in
working rules that impact natural resources and environmental quality.
From a policy standpoint, the primary difficulty in promulgating
working rules lies in trying to design legal-economic institutions that
provide decision-makers with an incentive structure to channel behavior, such that environmental externalities are internalized and
extraction of natural resources is controlled. In the simplest of terms,
“all bureaucracies are not created equal.” With respect to the fashioning or the redesigning of working rules and legal doctrines, much
work remains to be done to identify which institutional structures en10. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1994) (setting
forth a four-factor test for admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
702).
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hance the efficiency of legal institutions to accomplish their stated
natural resource and environmental goals. The extent to which the
institutions can be so structured will directly affect a nation’s natural
resources and the integrity of its environment.
Just as constitutions are not immutable, legal institutions are not
set in stone; they are themselves a response to economic needs. As
such, they can, and do, undergo structural revisions. Changes in legal
doctrines or the working rules of legal institutions will change the decision-making processes of those institutions and may alter the institutional choices that directly impact the extant structure of property
rights. A full appreciation of the relationship between legal institutions and the structure of property rights is fundamental to understanding natural resource and environmental policy. Such an appreciation is best gained through a discussion of the four property rights
regimes that comprise the economic impact stage of choice. At this
stage of choice, we see the most prominent interface between economics, law, and natural resource and environmental policy.
3. The Economic Impact Stage of Choice
Conceptually, it is useful to begin with the notion of four distinct
property right systems for organizing and controlling the allocation of
society’s scarce resources: the market sector, the public sector, the
communal sector, and the open-access resource sector.11 Initially each
sector is treated as if it exists separate and apart from the other sectors. As will be seen, typically, all four systems operate contemporaneously to allocate resources.
a. The Market Sector
In the pure market sector, all property rights are held privately as
bundles of fee simple absolute rights. According to the conventional
legal-economic definition of property rights, that which is owned by
individuals is not goods or resources but the rights to use goods and
resources. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz have stated,
“What are owned are socially recognized rights of action.”12 Thus—as
outlined by Tom Tietenberg—in the pure market sector, property
13
rights must have four characteristics. They must be:

11. See BROMLEY, supra note 6, at 21-34.
12. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON.
HIST. 16, 17 (1973).
13. See TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 41
(4th ed., 1996).
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• Universal—all resources are privately owned and all entitlements completely specified.
• Exclusive—all benefits and costs that have accrued as a result
of owning and using the resources accrue to the owner—and only to
the owner—either directly or indirectly.
• Transferable—all property rights are transferable from one
owner to another in a voluntary exchange.
• Enforceable—property rights are secure from involuntary seizure or encroachment by others.
With this structure of private property rights established by the
individuals in a society, acting through their institutions and with the
market as the system of social control, it is then possible for individuals to further enhance their welfare by specializing and engaging in
exchange through trade. The process of trade is conventionally
viewed as a purely voluntary endeavor and, as characterized here, it is
what transpires in the private market-sector. The voluntary nature of
this market process is such that no individual will engage in a trade
that leaves him worse off. The final allocative outcome will be arrived at once all the gains from trade have been exhausted in both exchange and production. Thus, barring externalities and the problem
of public goods, and given a set of private property rights structured
as above along with some initial distribution of rights, one can expect—consistent with the duality theorem—a market outcome that
provides a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources.
b. Public Sector
The public sector is another arena for organizing and controlling
the allocation of resources in a society. In this idealized sector, the
allocation and distribution of all resources will be determined by the
State. That is, in response to the individuals who comprise the society, the legal-economic institutions will define and assign status rights,
which are, in effect, eligibility requirements for individuals to gain ac14
cess to goods and resources. Status rights are rights to goods and resources that are exclusive, nontransferable, and are provided to individuals at the discretion of either the local, state, or federal level of
government (or some combination thereof). Thus, the provision of
status rights may be conceived of as “government provision” in its
broadest sense. As such, political-legal institutions are conferred with
14. For an exposition of how status rights were originally developed and presented, see
John H. Dales, Rights and Economics, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY 149 (Gene Wunderlich
& William L. Gibson, Jr., eds., 1972).
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the authority to make a wide-ranging spectrum of decisions giving rise
to a vast array of status rights.
With the public sector as the system of social control, the emergent structure of status rights has a direct impact on the allocation of
society’s natural resources and its environmental integrity. However,
unlike the market-sector resource allocations, the public sector
possesses no spontaneous mechanisms for ensuring that decisionmakers will formulate public policies that are economically efficient.
This problem is partially offset by the extent to which public-sector
decisions are based on benefit-cost calculations—in such cases, public
sector decisions can be said to approach a Kaldor-Hicks efficient allo15
cation of resources.
c. Communal Sector
Individuals in a society, acting through their legal-economic institutions, may decide that commodities or resources will be communally owned (res communes). In essence, common-property resources
are private property owned by a group of co-owners. Under communal ownership, a group of individuals would have the rights to use and
transfer the resource. Typically, a management group oversees the
manner in which the resource can be used and reserves the right to
exclude nonmembers. Depending upon the group rules used to manage the resource, communal property may result in an efficient allocation of resources.16
d. Open-Access Resources Sector
Finally, individuals in a society, acting through their legaleconomic institutions, may decide that commodities or resources will
be owned by no one—equally available to all (res nullius)—and thus,
will belong to the party who first exercises control over them. In this
case there are no property rights attached to the resource. The resulting open-access allocation of the resource would only be allocatively efficient if supply exceeds demand at a zero price. If supply
15. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency—the so-called compensation principle in economics—implies
that society should adopt those legal changes if a) the gainers from the change could have compensated the losers for their loss and still have remained better off themselves; and b) the losers
from the exchange could not have compensated the gainers for their foregone increase in welfare without themselves becoming worse off than in the original situation. For a straightforward
analysis, see CATHERINE M. PRICE, WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 27
(1977). For a more detailed explanation, see ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS
AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (1980).
16. It has been noted that in the absence of authoritative enforcement of the ‘group rules,’
the allocation of the resources under common property (res communes) may well degenerate
into an open-access (res nullius) state of overuse. See BROMLEY, supra note 6, at 27.
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does not exceed demand at a zero price—and society nonetheless retains the resource in open-access—the natural resource or environ17
mental sink will be overused.
e. Examples
It is at the economic impact stage of choice that individuals work
to revise property rights, and in doing so, ultimately alter (perhaps
only incrementally) the relative scopes of the sectors in the society—
market, public, communal, and open–access. It is important to understand that the nature of the choices made at the economic impact
stage of choice is quite different from the nature of those made at the
institutional stage of choice. Here individuals do not alter legal doctrines or working rules, but rather work to alter property rights—
thereby directly influencing the size, scope, and decisions in the
private, public, communal, and open–access sectors.
For example, individuals or groups may work to: i) determine
which resources will be directly under the State’s supervision via
status rights—e.g., more or less wilderness area; more or less wetlands; more or less mining, ii) to have a parcel of land designated as
“private property,” with use thus dictated by the individual owners in
the market sector, iii) change a status right eligibility requirement
enabling a firm to extract more or less of a natural resource from
state-owned land, and iv) define status rights through various publicsector actions—e.g., individuals may take advocacy positions at legislative hearings; comment on administrative matters on natural resource or environmental policies; or press claims through litigation.
Other examples at the economic impact stage of choice include actions to: v) ease or firm up the expedited permit procedures used by
developers to drain wetlands, vi) enhance or diminish the scope of
residential, commercial, and industrial zoning restrictions, vii) lobby
to have a parcel of land declared an open–access resource, viii)
change open-access fishing rights in a particular area to a communal
rights regime, ix) reassign water rights (e.g., assign the right to an upstream chemical firm to allow discharge of residuals into a stream, or
conversely, assign the right to unpolluted water to downstream users),
and finally, x) compel environmental commissions to either closely
monitor and strictly enforce standing environmental laws or to rarely
monitor and loosely enforce the same laws.

17. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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B. The Complex Legal-Economic Arena
Societies do not participate in the various stages of choice in a
static or isolated way. It is not uncommon for members of society to
revisit or urge others to revisit previous decisions made at the various
stages of choice. In addition, Western societies are typically structured so that the character of life is determined by all four of these
systems of social control—the market sector, the public sector, the
communal sector, and the open-access sector. The relative scope and
substance of each of the systems of social control is the result of a
collective determination of those who prevailed in choice-making
processes in the political/legal economic arena. Figure 2 displays the
integration of the three stages of choice—the constitutional, institutional, and economic impact stage—with the market, public, communal, and open-access resource sectors. Members of society, in attempting to promote economic growth and development—as well as
in their attempt to enhance environmental quality and protect natural
resources—can act both individually and collectively to reshape the
ultimate character of economic life and the natural environment
within which they live. They do so through recognition that neither
the constitution, the legal doctrines and working rules, nor the rights
structures are immutably fixed, but are truly a response to economic
needs and can be modified in response to changes in those needs.
The essential point to be stressed is that in pursuit of a wide variety of
goals—be they economic, environmental, or of any other variety—
participants in the political/legal economic arena will establish a
constitution so as to avoid the pitfalls and inefficiencies of anarchy,
will set in place legal doctrines and working rules for the of
structuring their legal-economic institutions, and will configure
private property rights, status rights, communal rights, and open–
access resources—thereby creating the private, public, communal,
and open-access resource sectors, respectively.
III.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

The analysis of law and public policy may be undertaken at any
one of the three levels of choice—constitutional, institutional, and
economic impact. The underlying logic suggests the following line of
reasoning:
ODZOHJDOGRFWULQHZRUNLQJUXOHV→ LQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUH→
LQVWLWXWLRQDOEHKDYLRU→  HFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH→
QDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV Hnvironmental quality.
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The comparative institutional approach within the American Institutional Approach to Law and Economics focuses on describing the
interrelationships between economics and the law. It attempts to describe the full array of impacts of alternative institutions, different legal arrangements, and alternative public policies and to articulate
whose interests will be served and at whose expense. To fully inform
choice, evaluation of alternatives ought not be done solely in terms of
economic efficiency, but rather ought to include other performance
indicators that, in the aggregate, tell us something of the total character of economic life. The goal, to the extent possible, is not normative
judgment, but rather description. Achieving that goal constitutes a
reaffirmation of, and staying within, the positive, descriptive domain
of American Institutional Law and Economics. By articulating the
outcomes of the alternative institutional arrangements available to
society, the comparative institutional approach fleshes out what is
going on in the legal-economic nexus and identifies the factors and
forces at work in the ongoing social construction and reconstruction
of the legal-economic reality.
Presented are six performance indicators in order to more fully
assess the outcomes of alternative institutional arrangements. The
authors are well aware that many of these performance indicators are
difficult to quantify and that some indicators may complement each
other, while others involve making difficult tradeoffs. In addition, the
authors forewarn the reader that no single performance indicator by
itself is useful in the abstract—each one is built upon certain antecedent normative premises that, at a very deep level, determine whose
18
preferences count. Consequently, any suggested set of performance
indicators (including those offered here) encompass the antecedent
normative premises of the selectors (authors) and represent their
convictions as to what is important in assessing legal change for both
the character of economic life and the environment. With these caveats, the six performance indicators expounded below adopt the ideas
and ideals that emanate from both institutional economics and
American Institutional Law and Economics. The authors are
persuaded that better informed choices can result from the use of
these indicators.
This section on performance indicators will begin with a discussion of the rule of law. In order to preserve the generality of the arguments set forth below, the discussion of the rule of law will be ab-

18. See SCHMID, supra note 6, at 242-43.
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stract in nature. It is simply too cumbersome, as well as restrictive of
the scope of the argumentation, to recast every argument about “the
rule of law” into arguments about “natural resource and environmental law.” While the discussion of the rule of law is cast in terms of
“the law,” virtually every point made generally about “the law” and
about calls for continuity of the “legal order” can be made for “natural resource and environmental law and policy.” The discussion of
the remaining five performance indicators, however, does incorporate
environmental and natural resource examples.
A. Rule of Law/Continuity
Legal change obviously alters the legal order. As Ronald H.
Coase has reminded us, in contemplating institutional change “un19
certainty about the legal position itself” must be taken into account.
The underlying rationale for the stated concern is that a society needs
a system of law (including natural resource and environmental law)
that provides them a stable pattern of expectations. So structured,
this allows people to plan their economic affairs with reasonable confidence so that they can know in advance the consequences of their
choices. Society’s quest for legal order and continuity can be understood at two different levels that have been identified by legal scholars—the meta level and the object level.20 As will be evident under
the discussion of the efficiency and equity performance indicators,
vague calls for continuity of the legal order obfuscate the nature of
the choice to be made. The collective and fundamental question remains: which legal order and whose continuity should be preserved?
1. Meta Level
The rule of law at the meta level is comprised of the systemdefining rules which establish the very definition of the legal system
itself. In comparative institutional approach terms, what transpires at
the meta level is analogous to the various machinations that take
place at the constitutional stage of choice or in the framing of a social
contract. The conventional expression of the rule of law carries with
it the notion that the law should be controlled by known rules that
prevent arbitrariness; in effect, the rule of law embodies the requirement to make rule-governed reliability and predictability as pervasive
19. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 13, 25
(Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
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21

as possible within the legal order. A legal system is said to satisfy
the requirements of the rule of law if its commands are: 1) clear and
general—i.e., specific yet independent of the status of particular individuals or groups), 2) accessible, knowable, and prospective—i.e.,
publicly promulgated with all changes to exert only future effect, and
3) performable—i.e., clear nexus exists between enacted law and the
pragmatic possibility of individuals being able to exercise it.22
The conventional notion notwithstanding, the response to the
question “what is the rule of law?” is still far from obvious. One response, by George P. Fletcher, is that “we are never quite sure what
23
we mean by the rule of law;” a reply consistent with Richard H.
Fallon’s observation that “the precise meaning of the rule of law may
be less clear today than ever before.”24 As Fallon points out, “although agreement on these elements establishes the rule of law as a
shared concept, many of the operative terms are vague.”25 Wolfgang
Friedmann also argues that there is no one interpretation of the “rule
of law.” To this end, Friedmann has observed that
the rule of law means to one the absolute integrity of private property, to another the maintenance of private enterprise, free from
state control and official regulation, and to another the preservation of the ‘right to work’ against the power of the unions to determine conditions of labor. To some, the rule of law means a minimum of administrative power whereas to others it means, on the
contrary, assurance by the State to all of minimum standards of
26
living and security.

At the meta level, different conceptions of the rule of law evoke
different manifestations of the legal order and corresponding calls for
continuity. Fallon describes four different types or conceptions of the
rule of law: a) the historicist ideal, b) the formalist ideal, c) the Legal
27
Process ideal, and d) the substantive ideal.

21. See ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE 112, 144 (1989).
22. As described by Richard Flatman, the dominant concern of those scholars writing on
the rule of law (such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Montsquieu, Hayek, Rawls, Fuller and others)
“has not been with the question whether or how much governance there should be, but rather
with preventing arbitrariness and other misuses of political authority and power.” Richard
Flatman, Liberialism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political Institutionalization: The Case of the
Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 302.
23. See George P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 12 (1996).
24. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., ‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997).
25. See id. at 4-5.
26. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 501 (1972).
27. See Fallon, supra note 24, at 10-24.
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a. Historicist Ideal
The historicist ideal of the rule of law promotes the notion that
the political legitimacy of the law and adjudication hinges on the historically understood meaning of past political decisions. That is, the
legitimacy of the law is founded in the fact that a clear and unambiguous nexus exists between the law’s substantive content and the past
actions of decision-makers who at all times—under historically established norms—possessed legitimate law-making power and were held
publicly accountable. Under a historicist ideal, constitutional law and
legal meaning would be fixed as determinately as possible, either
through “original understanding” or through the implied “intent of
the drafters and ratifiers.” Accordingly, through originalist interpretation, judges are able to rule based on “known” law rather than by
“creating” law through case-specific adjudication. The historicist
ideal achieves democratic legitimacy by promoting democratic acceptability and accountability. In part, this is accomplished by eliminating judicial arbitrariness, obliging judges (as well as ordinary citizens) to adhere to the laws, rules, and norms laid down by legislative
lawmaking authorities prior to their application to particular cases.
b. Formalist Ideal
The formalist ideal of the rule of law requires that the law be
generally and rationally understood to mandate particular conduct or
outcomes; the legal rules must be formulated as a clear prescription
and must be antecedent to any application. The formalist ideal endorses known rules over loosely defined standards or multi-factor
balancing tests. The emphasis is on form, not substance. As a
consequence, the legal rules provide maximally effective guides to
behavior and ensure that judges and other government officials are
bound by laws. Further, there must be clear lines of responsibility between the legislature and the judiciary. In this setting, adherence to
the formalist conception of the rule of law would yield clear, rule-like
results from both environmental statutes and constitutional directives
(when properly read). That is, appropriate conduct and legal outcomes would ensue.
c. Legal Process Ideal
The Legal Process ideal of the rule of law rejects the notion that
law must consist of rules pre-dating the occasions for their application. At the same time, with respect to the ongoing reconstruction of
law, the Legal Process ideal seeks to explain how judicial reasoning
(while not determined either by history or by known rules) enables
courts to adapt legal norms to rapidly changing conditions. Accord-

MERCURO_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC

Fall 2000]

04/17/01 12:47 PM

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

155

ing to the Legal Process ideal, certain limited requirements must still
be satisfied. Briefly stated, those requirements are: 1) procedural
fairness in the development and application of the law, 2) a nexus between the law and the notion of reasonableness, 3) a determination of
rights and responsibilities through reasoned elaboration, and 4) governance by rational deliberation together with the requirement of judicial review. Thus, in maintaining a reasoned connection (through
reasoned elaboration together with rational deliberation) between
recognized legal norms, sources of authority, and the outcome in particular cases, the Legal Process ideal provides a current, normative
consensus as to both the nature of legal institutions and their choicemaking processes. By confining the domain of proper legal decisionmaking, the Legal Process ideal validates legal decision-making and
legitimates the legal outcomes.
d. Substantive Ideal
The substantive ideal of the rule of law implies that manifestations of the law—rules, doctrines, conventions of legal reasoning—are
unintelligible as legal forms unless they are grounded in a substantive
political or legal theory imbued with its own internal morality and/or
norms of substantive justice. Thus, particular legal concepts derive
their meaning either from substantive political morality or, alternatively, substantive political morality provides controlling principles of
legal interpretation. Suffused with moral principles, the stated law
then constitutes a moral, authoritative guide to social conduct; in effect, this turns the rule of law into a partisan ideal.
In the context of the comparative institutional approach, individuals, groups of individuals, and public bodies all make allocative
choices among alternative courses of action under different (as well as
shifting) meta-level conceptions of the rule of law, the result of which
is thereby to reduce to some extent “uncertainty in the legal position
itself” for some, while preserving continuity for others.
2. Object Level
More often than not, the “uncertainty in the legal position itself”
is raised at the object level. The object level—the level at which laws
are made by those in power—is analogous to and would encompass
actions and decisions taking place at both the institutional stage of
choice and the economic impact stage of choice. It is at the object
level where individuals most often jockey for position in the legaleconomic-political arena in order to change law and to promote selected public policies. In their effort to enhance their individual or
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collective welfare, individuals inevitably create “uncertainty in the legal position itself.” This is a difficult issue for any society. On the one
hand, there are good reasons to maintain the rule of law at the object
level to preserve reasonably-backed expectations that provide economic actors with continuity and the ability to make allocative
choices among alternative courses of action. On the other hand, for
many reasons (especially changes in technology), legal change—such
as changes in property rights, legal doctrines, and working rules—
continues to occur producing an ever-shifting set of new expectations.
This, in turn, results in demands for a new legal order to accommodate the new set of reasonably-backed expectations and, once in
place, new calls for continuity.
While it is often argued that legal change should be incremental
and that order should be preserved, such arguments obfuscate more
than enlighten. Taking such a position addresses neither the question
of at what level—the meta level or the object level—the incremental
change should occur, nor what the rate of change should be. More
importantly such a position bypasses the question of whose interests
are served under the existing legal order and whose interests will be
served under a new meta-level conception of the rule of law or a new
object-level property right regime. The inclusion of the rule of law as
a performance indicator, in keeping with the comparative institutional approach, serves to help inform choice by making known the
potential consequences of more versus less continuity (and for whom)
that are occasioned by altering the rule of law at the meta level or at
the object level.
B. Efficiency
Allocative efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can be useful
in providing a partial guide for determining the appropriateness of a
proposed legal change; this is evident in numerous schools of thought,
including Chicago Law and Economics, Public Choice,
Neoinstitutional Law and Economics, and a comparative institutional
approach to American Institutional Law and Economics. A proposed
change may take the form of a new environmental law or natural resource policy, an emerging legal doctrine within environmental case
law, or a legislative or administrative working rule. However, one
must be careful in the application of an efficiency analysis. Frank I.
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Michelman described the generally accepted approach to conducting
an efficiency analysis within Law & Economics as follows:28
(1) a piece of law is selected for appraisal and, for that purpose is
marked off from the rest;
(2) the appraisal on the focal piece proceeds on the assumption
that the rest of the law is held constant;
(3) the piece is appraised by comparing it with one or more specific (historically proposed or plausible) alternatives having congruent
ranges;
(4) the piece is deemed efficient, vis-à-vis the alternative(s), if its
anticipated resource-allocation outcomes represent greater total
‘wealth’—as measured by total (estimated) willingness to pay for
those outcomes.
Thus, in an efficiency analysis, the strategy is to isolate and focus
on a single environmental law, legal doctrine, working rule, or policy
and evaluate it against a specified legal relief or background law for
analysis. Such an approach inevitably involves making antecedent
normative premises concerning both the level of analysis and the appropriate background law. In addition, the entire process is subject to
a circularity problem of using rights to define wealth-maximizing
rights. Further questions also arise when such an efficiency analysis is
conducted across the four sectors of the political economy. Each of
these are explored below.
1. Level of Analysis
Within Chicago Law and Economics, Public Choice, and Neoinstitutional Law and Economics, the preferred performance indicator
to inform choice is economic efficiency; concomitantly, there is a
stated willingness to take legal relief—the status quo structure of
rights—as given without further discussion. As Judge Richard A.
Posner pointed out:
[S]ince the efficient use of resources is an important, although not
always paramount social value, the burden, I suggest, is on the
authors to present reasons why a standard that appears to impose
29
avoidable costs on society should nonetheless be adopted.

The tendency to take the status quo structure of rights as given is
often expressed as part of a greater, pragmatic need to accept background law in order to ‘get on with the efficiency analysis’ of the new
28. See Frank Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 431-61 (1980).
29. Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 221 (1973).
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environmental law, legal doctrine, or proposed policy under scrutiny.
In the Chicago Law and Economics school, Coase has best illustrated
this, stating:
A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a
situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the
effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to decide
whether the new situation would be, in total better or worse than
30
the original one.

In a similar vein, statements exemplifying the philosophy of proponents of Public Choice declare:
The modified Paretian-Wicksellian framework implies that the social scientist must be prepared to accept the status quo when analysis indicates that tractable “solutions” to social problems are not
possible . . . . He accepts what is for the simple reason that is where
31
he starts.

and,
There is an explicit prejudice in favor of previously existing rights,
not because this structure possesses some intrinsic ethical attributes, and not because change itself is undesirable, but for the much
more elementary reason that only such a prejudice offers incentives
for the emergence of voluntary, negotiated settlements among the
32
parties themselves.

Undertaking an efficiency analysis following the contours outlined above necessitates “picking up a camera,” so to speak, that inevitably frames the issue and thereby conditions the outcome. Donald Schön has labeled this process “naming and framing,” and
describes the process and its effects as follows:
Things are selected for attention and named in such a way as to fit
the frame constructed for the situation . . . . Through the processes
of naming and framing, the stories make . . . the normative leap
from data to recommendations, from facts to values, from ‘is’ to
‘ought’. It is typical of diagnostic/descriptive stories such as these
that they execute the normative leap in such a way as to make it
33
seem graceful, compelling, even obvious.

In efficiency analyses, the parties of interest, the court, and the
legal-economic analyst may each frame the issue differently with a
propitious choice concerning the level of analysis and selected back30. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960).
31. Robert D. Tollison, Involved Social Choice, in THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE 3-7 (James
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1972).
32. James M. Buchanan, Politics, Property and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of
Miller et al. v Schoene, 25 J.L. & ECON. 439, 452 (1972).
33. Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social
Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 254, 264 (Andrew Ortony ed., 1979).
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ground law. For example, with the goal of efficiently controlling air
emissions, one could analyze a single provision of air law with
reference to the existing command and control structure of U.S. air
law (e.g., allowable levels of criteria pollutants). Alternatively, one
could assess the efficiency of the provision against a broadened background law that may include not only the existing command and control structure, but also the entire regime of the emissions trading program. Finally, one could assess the efficiency of that same provision
in the context of alternative forms for internalizing negative externalities (i.e., choosing between relying on legislative/agency regulations
versus common-law remedies). The “level of analysis” deemed “appropriate” depends upon which level best supports one’s argument in
attempting to press one’s individual claims.
The parties of interest in an environmental dispute, the courts,
and even the legal-economic analyst may differ as to which level of
analysis and which background law is best to assess the efficiency of
the proposed environmental policy. The ultimate choices that are
made then drive the efficiency analysis— and therein lies the inherent
tension with an approach that selectively culls out one law, rule, doctrine, or policy and places it against a selective legal relief. The tension stems from the desire to inform choice (through positive description) using an analysis that is, however, normatively conditioned by
both the selected level of analysis and the choice of background law.
The level at which the efficiency analysis is conducted and the propriety given to background law drive the results by making some elements of the analysis central and fundamental (and perhaps efficient),
while others are pushed into the background. This tension is further
complicated by the inherent circularity of the process.
2. Circularity Problem
In using efficiency as a performance indicator to assess the impact of a new law, working rule, proposed policy, or an alternative legal doctrine, the problem of circularity arises. Under the American
Institutional Law and Economics framework, rights (rules and legal
doctrines as well) are rights because they are protected, but they are
not protected simply because they are rights. The circularity problem
occurs because the law conditions the determination of what is efficient. Since efficiency is a function of rights, and not the other way
around, it is circular and inappropriate to maintain that efficiency
alone can determine rights. An outcome claimed to be efficient is ef-
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ficient only with regard to the assumed initial structure of rights—
which is often part of what is at issue.34 Just as costs, prices, outputs,
and wealth are derivative of a particular rights structure, so too are
benefit-cost calculations, wealth maximization, optimal levels of pollution, and optimal rates of extraction. Different specifications of
rights will lead to different (and economically noncomparable) minimizing or maximizing valuations. Thus, as Warren J. Samuels asserts,
“[t]o argue that wealth maximization [or any other efficiency criterion] can determine rights serves only to mask a choice of which interests to protect as rights.”35
3. Sector Analysis
Finally, there are significant differences in the measurement of
efficiency across the four sectors of the economy—private, public,
communal, and open-access. As Deborah Stone has pointed out, the
measurement of efficiency in the public sector is marked with some
very difficult issues; these same issues also come up in the context of
36
the communal and open-access resource sectors. What constitutes
efficiency in each sector of the economy is predicated, in part, on: i)
who determines the acceptable output goal or program objective, ii)
how multiple objectives are valued and compared , iii) how different
objectives or outputs benefit different constituencies or groups, iv)
how inputs are counted that simultaneously comprise outputs to
somebody else, v) which of the many benefits/outputs of any input to
count, and vi) how the virtually unlimited opportunity costs of resources used as inputs are calculated.37 Stone argues that “to go beyond the vague [efficiency] slogans and apply the concept to a concrete policy choice requires making assumptions about who and what
counts as important.”38 As Stone puts it:
There are no correct answers to these questions to be found outside
the political process. The answers build into supposedly technical
analyses of efficiency are nothing more than political claims. By or-

34. See A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS 57, 68.
35. Warren J. Samuels, Maximization of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian Law and
Economics as Policy Analysis, 60 TEX. L. REV. 147, 154 (1981).
36. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION
MAKING (1997).
37. See id. at 66.
38. See id. at 65.
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dering different assumptions, sides in a conflict can portray their
39
preferred outcomes as being efficient.

Environmental policies can be considered efficient only from the
point of view of the party whose interests are given effect through the
40
identification and assignment of rights. For those who advocate a
comparative institutional approach, there is much more to the character of economic life than vague references to efficiency; as Samuels
has argued, “[f]or law to be preoccupied solely with economic maximization would rob law of life and of much of what makes for human
meaning and significance.”41
As emphasized within American Institutional Law and Economics, in modern mixed-market economies, society is constantly redefining rights between competing sets of interests. Rights are in
flux—moving among the private sector, the public sector, the communal sector and the open-access resource sector. The inevitable result of the passage of an environmental or natural resource law or the
adoption of an environmental policy is that some will gain and some
will lose. Since rights are continually being created and recreated,
choices must be made against a legal relief that is constantly in flux.
The normative selection of the level of analysis, together with the
normative acceptance of prevailing background law, create implications for the assessment of efficiency and, therefore, for the development legal-economic policy. Given the win-lose nature of legaleconomic policy, one can garner a deeper understanding of the fundamental issues surrounding the quest for ‘efficient’ legal change only
by evaluating the implications of the chosen level of analysis and the
background law used therein. Advocating efficiency as the dominant
criterion of legal analysis and calling for the acceptance of the prevailing background law for ‘pragmatic reasons’ or to ‘set the stage for
voluntary agreements’ without regard to the implications on the nature and character of economic life, takes much for granted.
C. Distributional Equity
Determining the rights to natural resources and environmental
quality is a normative activity with immediate consequences for both
efficiency and distributional equity. That is, the definition and assignment of rights determines which efficient allocation and which
distribution of benefits and costs will prevail. At the same time, the
39. Id.
40. See Samuels, supra note 35, at 154.
41. Id. at 165.
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definition and assignment of rights to natural resources and the environment influence the future distribution of income, wealth, and
power in society. It has been argued that “most public policy decisions are usually even more concerned with distributional equity issues (namely, who gets the benefits and who pays the costs) than with
42
efficiency issues (namely, how large are the benefits and costs).” As
Jacob Viner wrote:
Extensive government intervention has come about largely as a result of dissatisfaction with the prevailing distribution of income. . . .
No modern people will have zeal for the free market unless it operates in a setting of ‘distributive justice’ with which they are tolera43
bly content.

Indeed, one might invert Posner’s argument44 and suggest that,
since distribution of resources is an important social value, the burden
is on authors to present reasons why an efficiency standard that appears to impose unfair distributions on society should be adopted.
Due to the non-uniqueness of efficiency, efficiency is inevitably
bound up with the issue of distributional equity. Indeed, as Warren
Samuels and A. Allan Schmid describe it, “the concept of efficiency
45
as separate from distribution is false.” Samuels explains in another
work:
With no unique optimal use of resources and opportunities independent of rights identification and assignment, the legal system
must select the [distributional] result to be pursued: the definition
of the efficient solution is both the object and the subject of the le46
gal system.

The choice of natural resource and environmental rights, then, is
ultimately an issue of distributional equity. Thus, to the extent possible, the distributional equity impacts consequent to an environmental
policy change should be disclosed. But here too, just as antecedent
normative premises underlie the rule of law and efficiency analysis,
normative premises inspire interpretations of what constitutes distributional equity. The concept of distributional equity can be explained in several ways. For instance, Charles Wolf has emphasized
that it can be defined in the sense of equality of outcome or, perhaps,
42. CHARLES WOLF JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENT: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES 30 (1997).
43. Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 69 (1960).
44. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
45. WARREN J. SAMUELS & A. ALLAN SCHMID, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (1981).
46. Warren J. Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, 1 J. POST KEYNESIAN
ECON. 100, 106 (1978).
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by reflecting on equality of opportunity (with little or no regard for
outcome).47 In contrast, distributional equity could be defined in
terms of horizontal equity (treating equivalently-situated people
equally) or vertical equity (treating unequivalently-situated people in
correspondingly unequal ways), or perhaps in terms of Marxist equity
48
(“from each according to ability, to each according to need”).
In addition, the issue of the distribution of welfare over time is
important. Consideration of inter-generational equity raises questions as to current generations’ responsibilities and obligations to future generations. Choosing one method over another to assess the
intergenerational impact of environmental and natural resource policies carries with it the ethical implications of weighing the preferences
and welfare of members of one generation vis-à-vis those of another
generation. Consequently, a comparative institutional approach must
be concerned not only with structuring institutions to help answer
such questions as, “who is part of the ‘community’?” but also with assessing the distributional impacts of the environmental policy change
on that acknowledged community. In all this, Schmid reminds us,
when people’s interests conflict, the call for distributional and/or
intergenerational equity in the abstract is meaningless and will only
obfuscate the real conflict and ethical questions to be faced. It is the
initial identification of the contours of distributional equity as a performance indicator that ultimately conditions the final outcome and
reveals facets of legal change and the character of economic life.49
D. “Freedom to”/“Freedom from”
As core themes of American Institutional Law and Economics
emphasize, individuals and groups of individuals in democratic societies use government to alter their constitution, change legal doctrine,
revise working rules, or change property rights in an effort to enhance
individual or collective welfare. While the freedom to do so is highly
valued, so too is it highly nuanced. In certain instances the fundamental issue is “freedom from the State,” while at other times the issue is “freedom within the State.” Arguably, advocates of freedom
from the State find themselves supporting either libertarian or anarchistic systems of government. Meanwhile, the more mainstream
concerns (those taken up here) involve “freedom within the State.”

47. See WOLF, supra note 42, at 28-30.
48. See id at 82-83.
49. See SCHMID, supra note 6, at 242-43.
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In this context, one immediately confronts: i) the paradox of freedom—that the freedom of some must be limited or restrained in order to enhance the freedom of others, and ii) the related issue of the
reciprocal nature of freedom in “Alpha-Beta” disputes.50
Addressing the paradox of freedom, it is important to note that
freedom is neither created nor destroyed by the State; that is, the
State, through legislative, judicial, and regulatory actions, changes
merely the pattern of freedom formerly allowable in society. In so
doing, a particular natural resource and environmental law, regulation, or judicial decision might be declared to have “created” freedom, and at the same time, to have “destroyed” freedom. Thus, while
law is a per se infringement on freedom, it is simultaneously a source
of freedom. As Samuels stated (quoting John Bowring):
The relation is reciprocal, and although one part may be stressed
over the other, from context to context, ‘the law can not create
rights,’ and therefore cannot create spheres of freedom, ‘without
creating the corresponding obligations,’ which is to say, without
limiting freedom: ‘. . .all laws creative of liberty, are, as far as they
51
go, abrogative of liberty.’

The freedom paradox manifests itself in many ways. Viet D.
Dinh reminds:
[T]o mark the tercentenary of Harvard University in 1936, Professor John M. Maguire described the law as the system of wise restraints that make men free, a definition that is still used to confer
52
the law degree on the university’s graduates.

In addition to the paradox of freedom, the question of the direction or flow of freedom is pertinent. That is, when environmental interests conflict, should Alpha be allowed to harm (impose uncompensated costs on) Beta, or should Beta be entitled to be free from
Alpha’s harm-causing actions? One’s freedom is relative to: i) the
freedom of others, and ii) the limitations imposed by both the prevailing legal relations that govern society and certain nonlegal factors
(e.g., customs). Since virtually every natural resource and environmental policy both restricts and enhances freedom (typically for different individuals or groups), freedom versus coercion should not be
the focus; rather, the concentration should be on whose freedom will
prevail and whose freedom becomes thereby conditioned. In the face
50. See Warren J. Samuels, Welfare Economics, Power, and Property, in PERSPECTIVES OF
POVERTY 61, at 63-67 (Gene Wunderlich and W.L Gibson, Jr., eds., 1972).
51. WARREN J. SAMUELS, THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 169 (1966)
(quoting JOHN BOWRING, 3 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 185 (1962)).
52. Viet D. Dinh, What is the Law in Law & Development, 3 GREEN BAG 19, 27 (1999).

MERCURO_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC

Fall 2000]

04/17/01 12:47 PM

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

165

of the “freedom to” / “freedom from” paradox, there is a natural tendency to offer up a joint maximand in an attempt to help unravel the
paradox. For example, one may conclude that: “The problem then is,
and has always been, how to maximize both freedom ‘to’ and freedom
‘from’.”53 Superficially, this may lay one’s mind to rest—as might
calling for “the greatest good for the greatest number.” However, as
the eminent French mathematician D’Alembert as well as renowned
author Garrett Hardin (Tragedy of the Commons) have wisely instructed, “it is not possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at
the same time.”54
This “freedom to” / “freedom from” conceptualization is perhaps
better understood in the context of the four property right regimes
presented in Section II.3—private property rights, status rights, communal rights, and open-access resources. Such rights undergird the
market, public, communal, and open-access resource sectors, respectively. Each sector constitutes a different means for allocating society’s scarce resources; concomitantly, each of these sectors represents
a different system of social control. Within each sector a certain pattern of “coercion” is legitimated, thereby determining a freedom vector for Alpha, while at the same time, legitimizing the costs imposed
on Beta. The legitimized freedom vector for Alpha (the set of rights,
expectations, and freedoms) and the pattern of costs imposed on Beta
are different, depending on the sector selected to allocate society’s
scarce resources. Thus, when a society decides to set in place its preferred pattern of legal relations, i.e., the preferred bundle of private
property rights, status rights, communal rights, and open-access resources, it is making a joint choice on both freedom and coercion. It
is deciding: i) which pattern of freedom is constructed—this indicates
who is allowed to impose uncompensated costs on whom within the
market, public, communal and open-access resource sectors, and ii)
which pattern of coercion is legitimated. Notwithstanding the assertions of Chicago Law and Economic as well as Public Choice theorists, one is not necessarily ‘free’ in the market sector and ‘coerced’ in
the public sector.
Within each sector and for each Alpha-Beta conflict, a choice
must still be made: should Alpha be allowed to impose a cost on Beta
(a “freedom to” inquiry), or should Beta be protected from Alpha’s

53. DEREK L. PHILLIPS, EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND RECTIFICATION 72 (1979).
54. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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action (a “freedom from” inquiry)? As Schmid has pointed out in his
discussion of ‘freedom’ as a performance indicator:
The issue is one of whose freedom rather than freedom in the abstract. The great moral choice in any society is whose freedom
counts when interests conflict in the face of scarcity. When people
conflict, global freedom is without meaning and can only obfuscate
55
the real conflict and the ethical question.

E. Macroeconomic Indicators
Any comparative institutional approach of public policy ignoring
macroeconomic performance indicators would be remiss. To the extent possible and when relevant, the macroeconomic impacts—e.g.,
employment rates, poverty rates, inflation, productivity, growth, fiscal
deficits, and trade deficits—of proposed natural resource or environmental policies should be taken into account. However, just as the
specification of the other performance indicators rests on antecedent
normative premises, so too do specific definitions of the
macroeconomic variables used in assessing the institutional impact of
natural resource and environmental policies. The more common
macroeconomic variables are explored below, and the issues surrounding the definitions of inputs and output are probed more
deeply.
1. Macroeconomic Variables
Regardless of the particular set of macroeconomic variables
used, each one rests on a normative definition. For example, several
institutionalized definitions rely heavily on assessing the character of
economic life—economic wealth and growth as measured by gross
domestic product (GDP) (implicating inclusion versus exclusion of
natural resource stocks), poverty (deciding the threshold level of family-of-four-income that should define the condition and thereby establish eligibility for a stream of government benefits or programs),
and inflation (selecting the ‘current basket of goods’ to calculate the
CPI, the PPI or the GDP deflator that will, in many instances, trigger
certain built-in government or industry actions, e.g., cost-of-living increases. As a result, the aggregate macroeconomic impact, as measured by these collective macroeconomic performance indicators, is
conditioned by the antecedent normative identification of their constituent elements. There is simply no way around this. As Tibor Scitovsky reminded us, when economists advocate the maintenance of
55. See Schmid, supra note 6, at 242.
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full employment, price stability, or enhanced environmental quality,
or, indeed invoke any macroeconomic indicator, they
can not disclaim responsibility for having made a value judgment
on the ground that he was only interpreting the preferences of society as a whole . . . . In so arguing, he would make the implicit value
judgment that the majority opinion fully represents and should de56
termine society’s preferences.

2. Inputs and Outputs
Moreover, the definitions of ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’—that is, those
items, the efficiency of which one wants to increase—require antecedent normative specification as to what constitutes each. Several
output categories are available—social output (the aggregate wellbeing of society), consumptive output (the value of goods and services from the consumer point of view), and productive output (the
value of goods and services from the producer point of view). The
value-laden choice of a particular definition of output as the maximand, which in effect is the choice of a particular social welfare function where many are possible, ultimately drives the decision of what
constitutes an efficient allocation.57
Some within Chicago Law and Economics and Neoinstitutional
Law and Economics have broadened the conventional definition of
commodities and resources (inputs) by using such terms as ‘effective
commodities’ and ‘effective resources.’ As proffered by Erik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, an effective commodity is the physical
commodity plus the associated property rights defining the commodity—including the rights to use and transfer the commodity. Whereas,
an effective resource is the physical factor of production (land, labor
or capital) plus the associated property rights to use and transfer the
resource.58 This notion of ‘rights running with’ commodities and resources is important from the vantage point of American Institutional
Law and Economics, as it gives further credence and deeper meaning
to “institutionalized markets.”
In American Institutional Law and Economics, the market is institutionally bounded and complemented by government. The institutionalized market is not an alternative to government. The ‘effective-rights’ component of inputs and outputs is a necessary element of
any market, with the ‘effective-rights’ deriving from government and
56. Tibor Scitovsky, The State of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 303, 315 (1950).
57. See Samuels, supra note 46, at 102.
58. See ERIK FURUBOTN & SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, Introduction: The New Property Rights
Literature, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 1-9 (1974).
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the power of government institutions. The market, as a system of social control, does not allocate resources apart and distinct from government. The allocation and distribution of effective commodities
and effective resources through institutionalized markets are a function of the government institutions and power structures that form
and operate through them.
Two simple examples illustrate the significance and importance
of the ‘effective-rights’ component of inputs and outputs, showing
that it is the rights being exchanged on the market that are at the core
of the character of economic life. First, consider the automobile, the
definition of which includes, among other things, the rights governing:
i) what shall literally comprise an “automobile” (now including air
bags and a catalytic converter together with severe legal sanctions for
disconnecting either), ii) government mandated standards and tests
relating to automobile production (including Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations of plant safety), and
iii) the terms, conditions, and enforcement of warranties. It is the
government-structured definition, assignment and enforcement of
rights that run with the physical entity that form and shape the market for automobiles—it is not a question of an automobile market
with government or without government. Similarly, on the input side,
what comprises the market for coal includes, among other things: i)
extraction permits/royalties/rents, ii) water discharge permits, and iii)
mandates to perform surface reclamation. Again, it is not a question
of a market for coal with government or without government. The
market for automobiles, for coal, and indeed for all products and
services, are institutionalized markets complemented by government.
Using macroeconomic performance indicators within a comparative
institutional approach requires that the antecedent selective identification and definition of these indicators be made clear, since the antecedent rights running with a commodity or a factor of production—
the very definition of inputs and output—say a lot about the character
of economic life and, ultimately, about the environment.
F. Ecological Integrity
As Garrett Hardin reminds in his seminal article:
If the word responsibility is to be used at all, I suggest that it be in
the sense Charles Frankel uses it. “Responsibility,” says this philosopher, “is the product of definite social arrangements.” Notice
59
that Frankel calls for social arrangements—not propaganda.
59. Hardin, supra note 54, at 1247.
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As society furthers its understanding about the workings of our
natural systems, a performance indicator such as ecological integrity
needs to be incorporated into the overall assessment of institutional
performance in order to help assess the impact of legal change and
public policy on our natural resources and environment. In a mixedmarket economy, individuals act in a multitude of ways that directly
affect a nation’s natural resource base (through rates of extraction)
and its environment (through rates of depositing residuals back into
the natural systems). It is illogical to assume that different environmental policy initiatives or legal changes, including changes in legal
doctrines, working rules, and property rights, will impact our natural
resources and the environment in the same manner and with the same
intensity.
In past decades, some production and consumption residuals
have been absorbed or assimilated by the atmosphere with relatively
few deleterious side effects; similarly, many ecosystems have exhibited few disruptions from the extraction of the renewable and nonrenewable resources utilized by the economy. However, more recently,
the ability of nature to assimilate residuals from industrial production
and consumption or to recover from mining or harvesting activities
accompanying resource extraction has been exceeded. Regional ecosystems have been unable to support these activities. Under such circumstances, changes within the affected ecosystems dramatically alter
or destroy the full array of structures and functions that these ecosystems provide. As a result, costs have been inevitably imposed onto
society in both the short and the long term.
The idea of ecological integrity as a performance indicator is intended to convey the notion of congruence with ecological systems.
In the simplest of terms, it addresses the question: do the legaleconomic institutions—and environmental policy initiatives or legal
changes that emanate therefrom—enhance or reduce a nation’s congruence with its ecological systems? That is, do such changes enhance
or undermine the ecological integrity of the nation’s natural environment? The principle of ecological integrity is derived from Karr’s as60
pects of biotic impoverishment (see Figure 3).

60. See J.R. Karr, Ecological Integrity and Ecological Health Are Not the Same Thing, in
ENGINEERING WITHIN ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS (P.C. Schulz, ed., 1996).
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LOW

INDICATORS OF ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY
MORE

LESS
Soil depletion, desertification, and salinization
Depletion of renewable resources
Impacts associated with extraction of non-renewable resources
Depletion and contamination of lakes, rivers, and aquifers
Habitat destruction and fragmentation
Loss of biodiversity
Introduction of exotic species, pests, and diseases
Alteration of biogeochemical cycling
Human induced climate change
Toxic chemical contamination

Figure 3: Ecological Integrity
The concept is defined by reference to several indicators, each
indicator providing one vector of assessment regarding the impact of
a particular activity. Thus, if a society is contemplating altering property rights, working rules, or legal doctrines in an effort to set in place
natural resource or environmental policies, one can use ecological integrity as a performance indicator. This will enable the analyst to assess whether the contemplated legal change leaves a nation’s political-economic system in greater or lessor congruence with its
underlying ecological systems.
From a somewhat broader vantage point, individuals in society
have options with respect to institutional design; within an American
Institutional Law and Economics framework, institutions matter.
Consequently, institutions may be structured in an attempt to maintain the ecological integrity of a nation to various degrees. For example, institutionalized markets can be structured with little or no natural resource and environmental laws and regulations—under the
rationalization that the nation espouses “laissez!faire” markets. Alternatively, institutionalized markets may be joined with a host of
technology based natural resource and environmental laws and regulations that attempt, to the extent possible, to maintain the ecological
integrity of a nation’s environment. On the other hand—as is now
occurring—whole new paradigms may be developed, aimed at providing new systems of social control, based on principles from para-
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digms such as sustainable development, ecological economics, or industrial ecology.61
Within a comparative institutional approach exists a wide spectrum of possible remedies to resolve natural resource and environmental problems. Such remedies could involve: i) amending or altering the constitution, ii) adopting new legal doctrines or specifying
new working rules, or iii) placing the rights to the natural resources or
to the environmental receiving medium (the air, water, or land resources), directly or implicitly, into one of the four property rights regimes discussed above. Alternatively, one may argue for a complete
paradigm shift adopting the principles and ideals set forth in either
sustainable development, ecological economics, or industrial ecology.
There are many environmental policy options, each of which involves
different impacts on the ecological integrity of the environment. Inherent in a comparative institutional approach to American Institutional Law and Economics is the need to describe the nature of the
choices being contemplated and the consequences that follow. Inclusion of ecological integrity as a performance indicator does not make
a case for any one set of remedies—it encourages informed choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In contrast to the variety of legal movements and theories that
have evolved in law—especially within the several approaches to Law
& Economics—American Institutional Law and Economics draws no
distinction between jurisprudential, legislative, bureaucratic, or regulatory treatments. Natural resource and environmental policy are additional sources of legal change. All are seen as particular parts or
manifestations of the interrelation of government and the economy,
or of legal and economic processes. The goal of a comparative institutional approach is not normative judgment, but description. A viable approach to the study of the interrelations between economics
and the law should give rise to a description of the full array of impacts of alternative institutions and legal arrangements together with
an articulation of whose interests will be served and at whose expense. Such analysis will not privilege one set of interests over others,

61. Sustainable development, industrial ecology, and ecological economics have been explored, respectively, in Sandra S. Batie, Sustainable Development: Challenges to the Profession
of Agricultural Economics, 71 AM. J. AG. ECON. 1083 (1989); Brad Allenby, Achieving Sustainable Development through Industrial Ecology, 4 INT. ENVTL. AFF. 56 (1992); Robert Costanza,
Ecological Economics: Reintegrating the Study of Humans and Nature, 6 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 978, 978-90 (1996).
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but it will enable those who study and participate the processes of the
legal-economic arena to better understand these processes and their
resulting effects on law and economy.
It may well be that a strictly positive approach is discomforting to
those who prefer a natural resource and environmental policy that
seeks refuge in determinate solutions to the questions of legaleconomic policy. Some may be inclined to dismiss it on this ground.
Likewise, perhaps it goes too far for those who would prefer to focus
narrowly on efficiency to take into account the antecedent normative
premises underlying each of the six performance indicators set forth
above. Schmid confronts the naysayers of the comparative institutional approach with an astute rejoinder:
If [American Institutional Law and Economics] has no dispositive
answer to resolve policy arguments, what is it good for? It can
identify many less than obvious sources of power in an economy so
that people can know where their welfare comes from. It can raise
the level of normative debate so that issues can be joined and people can live with tragic choices rather than ignoring and dismissing
62
them.

62. A. Allan Schmid, Institutional Law and Economics, 1 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 33, 36 (1994).

